Post-Quantum Cryptography Readiness Became a Product. A Scan Still Doesn't Rotate a Single Key

Getting ready for post-quantum cryptography takes two jobs: finding every place your systems use public-key encryption, and being able to swap it out. A readiness scan does the first job only. The second job is operational, it runs for years, and it depends on infrastructure that can rotate keys and certificates without a project for each one.

Post-quantum cryptography became something you can buy

Quantum readiness is now sold as a packaged product: scanners that score how exposed you are, monitor it, and produce a report. That is useful. It also makes it easy to mistake a report for progress.

Government guidance treats discovery as the starting line. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's strategy for automated discovery and inventory tools exists to support the assessment of federal agencies' progress toward post-quantum cryptography. The tools automate collecting the details an inventory needs. They do not change a single algorithm.

Why the inventory is hard

Most of the cryptography protecting a business was chosen by someone else. It sits inside third-party libraries, hosted software, TLS certificates on every endpoint, secrets in build pipelines and keys held by hardware you did not configure. A scan finds what it can reach. Anything it cannot reach still needs a person to look.

The dates are set

NIST published the standards first. On August 13, 2024, the National Institute of Standards and Technology finalized its principal set of encryption algorithms designed to withstand attack from a quantum computer, and encouraged system administrators to start transitioning as soon as possible.

Then it set the schedule. When this note was first written in June 2026, NIST IR 8547 was still a draft. The final NIST IR 8547, published in October 2026, keeps the same plan: NIST will deprecate quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography after 2030 and disallow its use under NIST standards and guidelines after 2035. Federal high value systems have earlier deadlines under Executive Order 14412.

The post-quantum cryptography timeline so far

1. Aug 21, 2023 Quantum-readiness factsheet. CISA, the NSA and NIST tell organizations to build a cryptographic inventory and a roadmap, and to talk to vendors.
2. Aug 13, 2024 First standards final. NIST publishes FIPS 203, 204 and 205.
3. Nov 12, 2024 Transition plan drafted. NIST IR 8547 goes out as a draft for comment.
4. Oct 27, 2026 Transition plan final. The final IR 8547 keeps the 2030 and 2035 dates.
5. 2030 Deprecation. Quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms are deprecated, and federal high-value systems must have moved their key establishment.
6. 2031 Federal signatures. The same federal systems must have moved their digital signatures.
7. 2035 Disallowed. Quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms are no longer allowed under NIST standards.

The federal dates reach past government. NIST's October 2026 announcement notes that Executive Order 14412 requires federal high-value assets and high-impact systems "to migrate by 2030 for key establishment and 2031 for digital signatures," and that "many organizations that work with the federal government will be affected as well." If you sell to an agency or a prime contractor, expect the question in your next security questionnaire.

Bigger keys are not the fix

The schedule covers quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms as a class, which is why moving to a longer RSA key does not help. The way out is to move to the new standardized algorithms. Symmetric encryption is not the main concern here; the work is in public-key exchange and signatures.

Why post-quantum cryptography matters before a quantum computer exists

NIST names the reason in the final report: the "harvest now, decrypt later" threat, where adversaries collect encrypted data now with the goal of decrypting it once quantum technology matures. If a client contract, a medical record or a trade secret needs to stay private for the next ten years, it is exposed today whenever it travels under quantum-vulnerable encryption.

The final NIST IR 8547 says this threat means acting now, "especially for data with long-term sensitivity, such as government secrets or medical records." That is where migration should start.

The post-quantum cryptography standards in plain terms

You will see these names in provider roadmaps and product notes. The August 2024 NIST release describes the first three; the last two are working terms used in this note:

ML-KEM (FIPS 203)

The primary standard for general encryption, used to agree on keys. It was built from the algorithm once called CRYSTALS-Kyber.

ML-DSA (FIPS 204)

The primary standard for digital signatures, built from CRYSTALS-Dilithium.

SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)

A second signature standard, built from SPHINCS+ on a different kind of math, intended as a backup in case ML-DSA proves vulnerable.

Quantum-vulnerable algorithms

The public-key methods in use today for key exchange and signatures, which the transition plan deprecates after 2030.

Crypto-agility

Systems that can swap one algorithm for another through configuration and routine updates, without rebuilding each application.

What ready actually looks like

The real deliverable is crypto-agility: infrastructure that can change an algorithm, reissue a certificate or roll a key across every server without a separate project for each one. Where rotation is automated, the new algorithms arrive with routine updates. Where every certificate needs a person to touch it, migration stalls.

• Automated certificates. Issuance and renewal run on their own, so changing the algorithm is a configuration change, not a hunt.
• Patching on a schedule. Libraries and operating systems that ship post-quantum support only help if updates actually land.
• Keys you can find. Secrets live in one managed place, not in scripts and old pipelines.
• One owner. Someone is responsible for the whole estate, so the work does not stop at the edge of a team.

For most businesses, post-quantum cryptography is a vendor question

If you run a small business or an agency, you do not operate most of the cryptography that protects you. Your hosting, software and service providers do. Your readiness is capped by your least prepared provider.

The practical step is to ask. The quantum-readiness factsheet from CISA, the NSA and NIST, published August 21, 2023, recommends building a cryptographic inventory, setting up a quantum-readiness roadmap, and engaging technology vendors about their plans for post-quantum cryptography. Make a documented roadmap part of how you choose and renew providers.

Questions to put to a provider

1. Which of the services you run for us use quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms today?
2. How are certificates and keys issued and rotated, and how much of that is automated?
3. What is your plan and timeline for the NIST post-quantum standards?
4. Can you give us an inventory of the cryptography in what you host for us?

Where LTFI sits

Kief Studio runs LTFI on a dedicated server for each company, patched and watched by us. That means one owner for updates, certificates and keys, which is what turns a scan into a migration. See what LTFI does, read about managed versus self-hosted systems, or book a walkthrough.

Frequently asked questions